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A Reply to Judicial Participation in Plea 
Bargaining: A Dispute Resolution Perspective 
BRIAN L. OWSLEY 
In response to Rishi Raj Batra, Judicial Participation in Plea Bargaining: A 
Dispute Resolution Perspective, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 565 (2015). 
My colleague and friend Rishi Batra wrote an interesting article proposing 
that judges take a more active role in criminal plea bargaining to safeguard 
the process.1 Specifically, he noted some structural problems with the 
appointment and compensation of the defense attorneys that inhibited the best 
representation.2 This tension, in turn, reduced incentives for effective plea 
bargaining on behalf of criminal defendants. He made several 
recommendations to enhance the use of judges in plea negotiations without 
diminishing their roles as judges.3 
As an initial matter, I would agree that anything to enhance the fairness of the 
criminal plea bargaining system is a net gain for the defendants themselves 
and society as a whole. Nonetheless, there are a couple of practical 
considerations that should be addressed. First, I tend to disagree with some of 
the assertions about criminal defense attorneys and their motivations.4 Second, 
I question the logistics of the approach suggested in the article.5 
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 4 Id. at 568–72. 
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I. MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT DEFENSE ATTORNEYS DO NOT SUPPORT THE 
NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH TO PLEA NEGOTIATIONS 
Regarding Professor Batra’s notions about criminal defense attorneys, he 
asserted that they have limited motivation and do not want to upset other actors 
within the criminal justice system.6 If there are indeed examples of defense 
attorneys engaging in legal malpractice and violating legal ethics, they are not 
explicitly addressed in the article. More importantly, if there are such 
improprieties by the defense attorney, then the judge, the prosecutor, or any 
other attorney cognizant of the problem has an ethical obligation to report any 
misconduct to the proper authorities.7 
Additionally, the article maintained that defense attorneys have no incentive 
to enhance their reputation because they are either public defenders or taking 
mostly court-appointed matters.8 In my experience, public defenders are often 
some of the most dedicated and diligent criminal defense attorneys around. 
Although they can have huge caseloads and fall victim to being overworked, 
they have significant knowledge about the types of criminal prosecutions that 
they handle such that they are often some of the most qualified defense 
attorneys one can have.9 Similarly, court-appointed attorneys will not keep 
getting appointments if their performance is at best lackluster or leads to 
reversals on appeal or in habeas petitions. No judge will continue to appoint 
deficient attorneys. Indeed, my former colleagues and I would periodically 
purge bad defense attorneys from the lists of attorney to be appointed. Judges 
care about the process to ensure just outcomes. 
Of course, money can be a powerful incentive for defense attorneys. Public 
defenders receive a salary, but court-appointed attorneys must work for 
whatever rate is determined by the applicable legislature. At the federal level, 
pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act of 1964,10 the hourly rate is only $127 per 
hour in non-capital cases.11 In my experience appointing attorneys, many of 
them found this rate attractive and seemingly competitive. State courts typically 
pay court-appointed attorneys in non-capital cases much less. For example, in 
2002, Louisiana paid such attorneys $42 per hour whereas Idaho paid them $50 
per hour.12 By way of comparison, the court-appointed rate in federal courts in 
                                                                                                                       
 6 Id. at 568–69. 
 7 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). 
 8 Batra, supra note 1, at 568–69. 
 9 When I was on the bench, my colleagues and I would joke that if we ever needed a 
criminal defense attorney, we would seek to establish poverty so that we could seek the 
Federal Public Defender. 
 10 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2012). 
 11 7 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY pt. A, § 230 
(2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/judiciary-policies/cja-guidelines/chapter-2-ss 
-230-compensation-and-expenses [http://perma.cc/9JHA-XCF4]. 
 12 THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, RATES OF COMPENSATION PAID TO COURT-APPOINTED 
COUNSEL IN NON-CAPITAL FELONY CASES AT TRIAL: A STATE-BY-STATE OVERVIEW 4 
(2002), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/legalservices/downloads/sc 
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2002 was $90 per hour.13 Court-appointed attorneys in Montana earn between 
$40 and $60 per hour; in Nebraska the rate is typically $60 per hour; in Seattle 
the hourly rate was only $43.50.14 Some states use a flat rate system like 
Missouri where each attorney receives $500 “for each non-capital felony not 
handled by a public defender.”15 
Professor Batra also posits that “[a] defense counsel who is unprepared in a 
plea negotiation, who does not counter any offer from the prosecution, or who 
does not introduce any mitigating evidence will go undetected.”16 Of course, the 
criminal appeals system in conjunction with habeas petitions is designed to 
address criminal defense attorneys who are unprepared or failed to introduce 
mitigating evidence.17 
II. THERE ARE LOGISTICAL CONCERNS REGARDING THE APPROACH 
PROPOSED TO PLEA NEGOTIATIONS 
As the article notes, in the federal court system, in which I have my 
experience, the judges are not allowed to be involved with the plea agreement 
negotiations.18 Notwithstanding this ban in the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, there are other factors, including the logistics of the article’s 
proposal, that call into question the involvement of judges in plea bargain 
negotiations. 
If federal judges are allowed to participate in criminal plea bargains, they 
would still have to limit their roles insofar as presiding over prosecutions in 
where they previously participated in the plea bargain process. Federal 
magistrate judges often mediate civil matters, but typically do not handle the 
merits of an action that they mediated that did not settle.19 Similarly, federal 
                                                                                                                       
laid/indigentdefense/compensationratesnoncapital2002_narrative.authcheckdam.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/QU5E-6ZXY] (prepared for the Bar Information Program of the American Bar 
Association’s Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants). 
 13 Id. at 13 
 14 Id. at 5–6.  
 15 Id. at 8.  
 16 Batra, supra note 1, at 571. (citing Rishi Batra, Lafler and Frye: A New 
Constitutional Standard for Negotiation, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 309, 326–31 
(2013). 
 17 See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 537–38 (2003) (reversing appellate court, 
finding that “available mitigating evidence, taken as a whole, ‘might well have influenced 
the jury’s appraisal’ of Wiggins’ moral culpability”); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 
(2000) (finding that habeas petitioner “was denied his constitutionally guaranteed right to the 
effective assistance of counsel when his trial lawyers failed to investigate and to present 
substantial mitigating evidence to the sentencing jury”). 
 18 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1) (“The court must not participate in these discussions.”); see 
also United States v. Davila, 133 S. Ct. 2139, 2140 (2013). 
 19 Black v. Kendig, 227 F. Supp. 2d 153, 155–57 (D.D.C. 2002) (holding that a 
magistrate judge must recuse himself from action in which he had previously mediated to 
avoid the appearance of unfairness); accord Kearny v. Milwaukee Cty., No. 05-C-834, 2007 
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judges involved in criminal plea bargain negotiations cannot be involved in any 
facet of the case after the plea bargaining is concluded.20 
This ban on continued participation, where a judge had previously been 
involved, would present problems. For example, in the state of Texas, there are 
many places where there would only be a single magistrate judge. Professor 
Batra is unclear about the timing for this proposed judicial involvement in plea 
bargains, but even if it occurred after arraignments, a magistrate judge could be 
asked to handle subsequent matters like suppression hearings or taking a guilty 
plea in prosecutions that could not be resolved by plea negotiations. 
For example, in the Galveston Division of the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of Texas, there is only one magistrate judge.21 If the 
magistrate judge handles the plea negotiations, it would be difficult for that 
same judge to handle any subsequent matters involving the same prosecution. 
This issue is further compounded by the fact that there is only a single district 
judge handling matters in Galveston and that person splits time with the 
Victoria Division as well.22 Similarly, the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Texas raises similar staffing concerns. The Alpine Division 
does not have an assigned district judge and has only one magistrate judge 
assigned to it.23 Both the Waco Division and the Midland Division have just 
one district judge and one magistrate judge each.24 
Turning to the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Texas, one finds a similar situation. The Wichita Falls Division only has a part-
time magistrate judge.25 The Abilene Division is served by a single magistrate 
judge who also covers the San Angelo Division, but there is no permanent 
district judge in either division.26 The Amarillo Division has a magistrate judge 
                                                                                                                       
WL 3171395, at *2–3 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 26, 2007). But see SEC v. Sunwest Mgmt., Inc., Civ. 
No. 09-6056-HO, 2009 WL 1065053, at *5 (D. Or. Apr. 20, 2009) (ruling that a magistrate 
judge need not recuse himself from an action after serving as mediator); accord Garrett v. 
Delta Queen Steamboat Co., Civil Action No. 05-1492-CJB-SS, 2007 WL 837177, at *3 
(E.D. La. Mar. 14, 2007). 
 20 Batra, supra note 1, at 573. 
 21 Offices, Galveston Division, U.S. DISTRICT & BANKR. CT., SOUTHERN DISTRICT TEX., 
http://www.txs.uscourts.gov/offices/galveston-division [http://perma.cc/FHK7-AXYU] (last 
visited Sept. 10, 2015). 
 22 Offices, Victoria Division, U.S. DISTRICT & BANKR. CT., SOUTHERN DISTRICT TEX., 
http://www.txs.uscourts.gov/offices/victoria-division [http://perma.cc/CM46-KJKT] (last 
visited Sept. 10, 2015). 
 23 Judges’ Directory and Biographies, U.S. DISTRICT CT., WESTERN DISTRICT TEX., 
http://www.txwd.uscourts.gov/General/Judges/biographylist.asp [http://perma.cc/Z99B-Y2 
T9] (last visited Sept. 10, 2015). 
 24 Id. 
 25 Locations, Wichita Falls, U.S. DISTRICT CT., NORTHERN DISTRICT TEX., 
http://www.txnd.uscourts.gov/location/wichita-falls [http://perma.cc/WDH5-HZF3] (last 
visited Sept. 10, 2015). 
 26 See Locations, Abilene, U.S. DISTRICT CT., NORTHERN DISTRICT TEX., 
http://www.txnd.uscourts.gov/location/abilene [http://perma.cc/8YEQ-FRZM] (last visited 
Sept. 10, 2015); Locations, San Angelo, U.S. DISTRICT CT., NORTHERN DISTRICT TEX., 
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and a district judge.27 The Lubbock Division has a magistrate judge and a senior 
district judge.28 Of course, major cities would have more magistrate judges to 
handle the work. Moreover, magistrate judges from other divisions could be 
asked to assist in circumstances in which there is a conflict because a magistrate 
judge has already handled the plea bargain negotiations. Still, such coverage 
does put a strain on magistrate judges who are already busy in their divisions to 
travel to another place to handle a discrete matter. 
Other states present a starker picture of the staffing logistical problems. For 
example, the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota has a 
total of three magistrate judges and three district judges to serve the entire state, 
with one of each in both Fargo and Bismarck.29 In the United States District 
Court for the District of Wyoming, there are currently three district judges and 
two magistrate judges.30 One of the magistrate judges sits in Cheyenne, which 
is the seat of the court, and the other one presides in Mammoth Hot Springs 
inside Yellowstone National Park because there is a large misdemeanor 
criminal docket for a myriad of offenses.31 There are part-time magistrate 
judges in Casper, Jackson, Green River, and Lander, while there are two district 
judges in Cheyenne and one in Casper.32 
On some level, I may be just building up a straw figure to knock it down by 
addressing the logistical problems of federal judges being involved in plea 
negotiations. Clearly, they are barred from handling them pursuant to the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Still, the logistical problems noted above 
resonate with state courts as well. There are plenty of state courts that do not 
have multiple judges to handle substantive matters in a prosecution if a judge 
involved in a plea negotiation feels recusal is appropriate, or if a party objects to 
the judge’s continued involvement in the case. Ultimately, because in those 
                                                                                                                       
http://www.txnd.uscourts.gov/location/san-angelo [http://perma.cc/2NC5-QZVK] (last 
visited Sept. 10, 2015). 
 27 Locations, Amarillo, U.S. DISTRICT CT., NORTHERN DISTRICT TEX., 
http://www.txnd.uscourts.gov/location/amarillo [http://perma.cc/5TP5-JFUE] (last visited 
Sept. 10, 2015). 
 28 Locations, Lubbock, U.S. DISTRICT CT., NORTHERN DISTRICT TEX., 
http://www.txnd.uscourts.gov/location/Lubbock [http://perma.cc/PS2U-5EMJ] (last visited 
Sept. 10, 2015). 
 29 The Judges Chambers, U.S. DISTRICT CT., DISTRICT N.C., 
http://www.ndd.uscourts.gov/judges-chambers [http://perma.cc/7T8Q-FN7K] (last visited 
Sept. 10, 2015). 
 30 About Wyoming and This District, U.S. DISTRICT CT. WYO., 
http://www.wyd.uscourts.gov/htmlpages/about.html [http://perma.cc/S2BU-ZYAV] (last 
visited Sept. 10, 2015). 
 31 See Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 22–23 (1939) (holding that federal courts have 
criminal jurisdiction over national parks); 16 U.S.C. § 3 (2012) (authorizing the Secretary of 
Interior to promulgate regulations “necessary or proper for the use and management of the 
parks . . . [that are] under the jurisdiction of the National Park Service”); see also Brian L. 
Owsley, Issues Concerning Charges for Driving While Intoxicated in Texas Federal Courts, 
42 ST. MARY’S L.J. 411, 413–20 (2011). 
 32 The Judges Chambers, supra note 30. 
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areas where fewer judges exist, there can be logistical problems, and such 
problems can even arise in districts with more judges, the use of judges may not 
be an optimal approach. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Professor Batra’s article provides an insightful solution to a problem 
regarding plea negotiations, and I tend to favor ideas that promote more equity 
in the criminal justice system. However, I am cautious about devoting so much 
time and energy toward this new approach in light of the judiciary’s already 
limited resources. Utilizing judges so heavily in the plea negotiation process 
may enhance agreements, but in those cases that are not resolved, there can 
significant logistical problems for the courts. If judges were to shoulder this 
burden, then additional resources and funds would be necessary to ensure that 
they do so properly. Such funds could just as easily be provided to hire more 
public defenders and increase the compensation rates for court-appointed 
attorneys. 
